Apr 11, 2011

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EDITOR’S ANALYSIS: There are so many “Trustees” running around these days, it is impossible to figure out what they do and if they even really exist. In the article below, Streitfield points out that the “Trustees” on deeds of trust “in those states where foreclosures are not governed by the courts” are essentially phantom entities. The original trustee on teh deed fo trust is usually a genuine entity qualified to act in good faith on behalf of the beneficiary.

There are three phantom deals running parallel in each “securitized” loan situation: (1) the actual transaction which involves money exchanging hands and where there is no trustee at all named on the deed of trust for the investor-lender (2) the fictitious securitization infrastructure under which the investor believes the receivables are being carved up into pieces that reduce risk to nearly zero in which there is no trustee named on the deed of trust for investor-lender or anyone else and (3) the fictitious transaction described in the closing documents in which a trustee is named on the deed of trust for a false beneficiary.

The current practice is driven by the fact that the original “trustee” on the deed of trust is unwilling to perform tasks that are at best dubious as to their authenticity or compliance with legal requirements. Thus when the “loan” is declared in default (but is not necessarily in default) by some remote entity taking instructions from another remote entity, a “substitution of trustee” is executed and filed. This is of course years after the deal was done usually and is signed by people without authority — like from MERS or some other robo-signing forgery and fabrication mill. The new “Trustee” is completely controlled by Wall Street and simply has a name that is used to initiate foreclosures, whether it even knows that the notice went out or not.

This practice is mirrored by the now multitudinous so-called foreclosure mills that were bankrolled by Wall Street, who staffed the offices, supplied the money, and and personnel, and leased the license of an attorney who had few scruples in connection with the use of his name or law license. If you get a look at the daily calendar of David Stern or any of the other foreclosure mill moguls you’ll see they didn’t have much to do. Neither do the trustees. BILLIONS of dollars were paid out to such mills, trustees, and remote vehicles for them to keep their mouths shut and do what they were told to do.

As the article below points out, people like Adam Levitin are highly critical of the deals that are being made with the remote vehicles and servicers, inasmuch as the real players who too the money from the investors, intentionally lost it as part of a scheme whereby they turn the investors’ loss into a profit worth multiples of the loss, and are now seeking to take homes in foreclosures using appearances instead of reality.

Levitin says, and I agree, that these deals are worse than no deal at all because they provide political cover to Wall Street. We can expect to see more of them until Wall Street has its way and the matter is “settled” with entities that have no assets, no authority, and whose mere presence causes defective and chaotic title problems for generations to come.

New Rules for Mortgage Servicers Face Early Criticism

By DAVID STREITFELD

Federal banking regulators have not officially imposed their new rules for the top mortgage servicers, but criticism is already being heard. A wide coalition of consumer and housing groups is denouncing the legal agreements, which are likely to be published within a few days.

The new rules require the servicers to improve their processing systems, to stop foreclosing while negotiating to modify the loan and to give borrowers a single direct means of contact.

Servicers will be required to bring in a consultant to investigate complaints by homeowners who lost money because of foreclosure processing errors in 2009 and 2010. In some cases the homeowners could be compensated.

The problem, said Alys Cohen of the National Consumer Law Center, is the agreements “do not in any way require the servicers to stop avoidable foreclosures, and that is what we need.”

At the heart of the complaints by Ms. Cohen and others is whether the servicers, which are arms of the biggest banks, may be compelled to give households fighting foreclosure a better shot at renegotiating their loans and staying in their properties.

The servicers argue that whatever mistakes they made in handling foreclosures — errors that will be amply on view in a regulatory report accompanying the agreements — they never foreclosed on anyone not in severe default. They are strongly resisting proposals to cut the debt of homeowners in default to help them stay put.

The issue has wide repercussions for an ailing housing market. About four million people are either in foreclosure or near it. Some housing analysts argue that adding those houses to the abundant inventory already on the market will further reduce values for all owners and prolong the downturn.

To some critics, the pending fixes are all but useless. Adam Levitin, an associate professor of law at Georgetown University who has closely monitored efforts to more tightly regulate foreclosure practices, calls it “a sham settlement” that is worse than none at all.

“It gives the banks political cover, undermines attempts at a real and just resolution, and could be the basis for the regulators to claim that state actions are pre-empted,” Mr. Levitin said. Allowing federal regulators to pre-empt or elbow aside potentially stronger state actions during the housing boom has been widely seen as contributing to the collapse.

Representatives of the regulators, including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, declined to comment.

The legal agreements, which take the form of consent orders, will be signed by the 14 largest servicers, including Bank of America, Wells Fargo and JPMorgan Chase. They are being published on the heels of new evidence that foreclosures are still being conducted improperly.

The Washington attorney general, Rob McKenna, sent a letter last week to a group of trustees. The trustees work with the servicers in states like Washington where the courts do not oversee foreclosures.

Washington law requires trustees to have a local office so borrowers in default can submit documentation or last-minute payments. In a continuing foreclosure investigation, Mr. McKenna found that many trustees were effectively invisible. In his letter, Mr. McKenna called their absence “widespread, illegal and contrary to an effective and just foreclosure process.”

Among the groups protesting the consent orders are the Center for Responsible Lending, the Consumer Federation of America and dozens of local and regional housing groups. In a letter to the regulators, the groups are asking for the withdrawal of the agreements in favor of “specific and protective measures regarding loss mitigation, account management and documentation.”

Efforts to get the servicers to change their practices have a long and not particularly successful track record. During the boom the servicers needed to do little more than deposit the checks of borrowers. That changed when defaults began to swell and borrowers called to try to work out new loan arrangements.

Servicers were ill-equipped to deal with something so complicated. Nor did they have much incentive, because in most cases the loans had long ago been sold to investors. Borrowers complained that servicers were sloppy, that they lost paperwork and then lost it again, that they reshuffled borrowers among endless personnel to no effect and that they foreclosed on the property even while supposedly negotiating to save it.

These assertions were brought into sharp focus last fall after revelations by servicers that in their haste and sloppiness they had broken local laws and regulations. They imposed moratoriums while saying they were clearing up the problem, but by then a range of federal and state investigations were under way.

A coalition of all 50 state attorneys general joined by the Obama administration set out to change the process of foreclosure so more borrowers could remain in their homes. The goal of the regulators was more limited.

The efforts by the attorneys general to impose a broader settlement with a multibillion-dollar penalty and some provision to restructure mortgages by cutting debt are continuing, however slowly.

Attorney General Tom Miller of Iowa, who is leading the effort, said a settlement with regulators “neither pre-empts nor impacts our efforts.” The attorneys general are striving to pursue their negotiations out of the public eye so every incremental step is not open to commentary and criticism.