Dec 15, 2020

WHAT ABOUT ALL THE OTHER LEHMAN DEALS WHERE CHASE CLAIMED OWNERSHIP AND STOLE PROPERTY FROM HOMEOWNERS?

Neither Chase nor anyone else actually has a claim or a case against the homeowner if the premise is that either Chase or some other named “trustee” owns the loan through the magical process of “securitization”. The fact that securities were issued is not a license to lie. Using a label doesn’t mean anyone is telling the truth.

Even Chase couldn’t stomach defending a nonexistent securitization process; so it lied about something else. In this case it lied about ever receiving the note which would, in turn, have been evidence of transfer of title to the underlying debt/obligation.

Hearsay is hearsay. It is not admissible as evidence of anything. The affiant in submitting the affidavit stated only that he reviewed records and came to the conclusion that the note had been delivered, raising the presumption that the loan obligation had been purchased.

Courts are not interested in a witness’s conclusions. they are interested in the facts. And the facts are that the affiant did not attach the records about which he was testifying — in order for the court to come to its own conclusion.

The reason for all of this is that Chase never did get delivery of the note, never purchased the underlying obligation for value, and therefore did not own or control the transction that is labelled as a loan. It lied about everything, concealing the fact that a Lehman trust claimed ownership (which was also a lie).

See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Tumelty, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 6766 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)

From Follow up by Bill Paatalo:

Nice mini-victory here. I’ve been assisting in this case. This goes to the heart of what we’ve been discussing and posting regarding the WaMu notes. Chase cannot overcome the obvious deficiencies. I mentioned this case on the Show and the fact that Chase admitted after judgment the loan was in a Lehman Trust.
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The plaintiff asserts that it was in physical possession of the note at the time it
commenced this action. The note was not attached to the complaint. In support of its motion, the plaintiff relied upon the affidavit of Evan L. Grageda, an employee of the plaintiff. Grageda averred that, based on his review of the plaintiff’s records, the plaintiff took possession of the note on or about July 20, 2009, and that the plaintiff was in possession of the note when the action was commenced on September 13, 2012. There were no business records attached to the affidavit which demonstrate that the plaintiff took possession of the note on that date.
 
We agree with the defendant that the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff lacked a
sufficient evidentiary basis to demonstrate that the plaintiff possessed the note when it commenced this action. Grageda’s averments relating to the date that the plaintiff possessed the note are inadmissible hearsay and lack probative value because they are based on unidentified records (e.s.) which were not included with his affidavit (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Dennis, 181 AD3d 864; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Cavallaro, 181 AD3d 688; American Home Mtge. Servicing, Inc. v Carnegie, 181 AD3d 632; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Gordon, 171 AD3d 197, 208-209). Since the plaintiff failed to meet its initial burden as the movant, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due to the plaintiff, regardless of the sufficiency of the defendant’s opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853). (e.s.)
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial and appellate attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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