May 1, 2011

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EDITORIAL COMMENT: I agree with the editors at the NY Times. Geithner’s loophole is just plain wrong. It is borne out of fear of the unknown. The uncertainty that accompanies letting the derivatives market come under scrutiny and what it would mean if you REALLY found out the condition of the financial markets has created a huge fear that it COULD mean Armageddon. That argument, always weak at best, is based on the lack of precedent or predictive information because what Wall Street did this time was unprecedented.

In plain language, policy makers have not taken the time to analyze the entire system the way their job description says they should do. The truth is that we nailed ourselves in the 1929, we passed Glass-Steagel and avoided it for a awhile, we deregulated and repealed Glass Steagel and nailed ourselves again.

We have a robust collection of banks and investment banking firms other than the the megabanks that have the ability and resources to collectively pick up all the slack from the megabanks and probably do much more in a true free market, instead of the monopolistically controlled market we have now. Europe understands it and is proceeding with regulation and investigations. Why do we pretend not to understand? Because the banks own the place.

What will happen? Using past behavior as the only reliable indicator of future behavior is that the banks will do it all over again, only worse, because they escalate each time.

Mr. Geithner’s Loophole

Until recently, the big threats to the Dodd-Frank financial reform law came from Republican lawmakers, who have vowed to derail it, and from banks and their lobbyists, who are determined to retain the status quo that enriched them so well in the years before, and since, the financial crisis. Now, the Obama Treasury Department has joined their ranks.

In an announcement on Friday afternoon — the time slot favored by officials eager to avoid scrutiny — the Treasury Department said it intends to exempt certain foreign exchange derivatives from key new regulations under the Dodd-Frank law. These derivatives represent a $4 trillion-a-day market, one that is very lucrative for the big banks that trade them.

A loophole in the law — which the bankers and their friends, including the administration, fought for — allows the Treasury secretary to exempt the instruments. The arguments in favor of exemption, beyond a desire to please the banks, were always unconvincing. They still are. The Treasury Department has asserted that the exempted market is not as risky as other derivatives markets, and therefore does not need full regulation.

That claim has been disputed by research, but even if it were true, it would be a weak argument. For instruments to be relatively safer than the derivatives that blew up in the crisis, necessitating huge bailouts, hardly makes them safe. Worse, dealers could probably find ways to manipulate the exempted transactions so as to hedge and speculate in ways that the law is intended to regulate.

The Treasury Department insists its exemption is narrow and regulators will have the power to detect unlawful manipulation. In their spare time, perhaps? The financial crisis made clear what happens when everyone doesn’t have to play by the same rules. And it made clear that the taxpayers are the ones who pay the price.

The department has also said that because the market works well today, new rules could actually increase instability. That is perhaps the worst argument of all. It validates the antiregulatory ethos that led to the crisis and still threatens to block reform.

The Treasury’s plan will be open for comment for 30 days. Count us opposed.