Nov 16, 2010

Editor’s Comment: I picked this up from STOPFORECLOSUREFRAUD.com but you can get it directly if want to read it all. There are three points I wish to draw your attention to:

  1. The realization that we have a systemic title problem that is getting worse daily.
  2. Neither the media nor the legislators get it: they say that they don’t want to “de-legitimize MERS”. WARNING: THIS PRESUMES THAT IT IS LEGITIMATE NOW. It isn’t. First of all MERS disclaimed any financial or property interest as a condition to being named on the mortgage or deed of trust so it is not only a nominee, it is nothing. You might just as well have filled in Donald Duck. Second the use of a nominee with undisclosed principals violates truth in lending laws and defeats the purpose of recording interests in real property. BOTH MERS and the LOAN ORIGINATOR were shills, straw-men, for undisclosed people who could be changed at will. Thus anyone examining the title would be required to take the word of a private party with no actual knowledge as to who should be considered the mortgagee at any point of time, which could change from minute to minute. Third not only is it wrong in principle it is wrong in fact: the MERS database is an unsecured database and intentionally designed as such. ANYONE can get a user name and password and change the data and they do. I’ve seen it. One minute the underwriter is listed as the “owner” and the next minute it is the servicer, and the next minute it is the named Trustee of the pool. So the question is really simple: Is it worth creating title chaos for decades to come and maybe forever just to save the skins of some megabanks that are completely unnecessary and whose presence in the marketplace is destroying the American position of world leadership?
  3. The remedy that is being piloted around the country is that they are bringing the foreclosures in the name of the loan originator. They call that a “work-around.” You might call it a shell game. This is what happens when the people with the money control the microphone and the people with the knowledge are sent to Siberia. Let me make it simple: the loan originator either was or was not the lender. They were the lender if the money came from their capital resources available under regulation for lending. If the money was wired in from, say, Wells Fargo with whom the  “loan Originator” had no account, or it was a wired from ANY source other than the “loan originator” then the money used by the closing agent was the money of an undisclosed third party. That is called a table-funded loan. Under Regulation Z, table funded loans as a pattern of practice are presumptively predatory and subject to rescission and other remedies. A table funded loan is a loan in which the real lender is not disclosed depriving the borrower of knowing who  he/she is doing business with amongst other things and its illegal and it should be. By definition it means that the party named on the note and mortgage is NOT the creditor. So if their “work-around” is to sue in the name of the loan originator, then in discovery you find that payments were directed to parties other than the originator. Why would that be if they were the lender?

In short, this dog won’t hunt. There is no way to fix the mortgages, notes and obligations without the investors direct participation and without the borrower’s participation. The banks don’t want to do that because when the investors and borrowers compare notes they are going to find that what they thought was the biggest fraud on earth, is really tens times worse. The test is easy: if the loans were real and everything was legitimate, the  why would you need MERS or a mortgage originator who isn’t the lender? If this is just a technicality, then why can’t they just fix it by bringing everyone into the courtroom or the negotiating table? The answer is they can’t and they don’t want to because they too busy milking this until there is no juice left — then  they might say OK here, take it. It reminds me of an old Buddy Hackett joke about a duck. remind me to tell it to you when nobody else is listening.

Categorized | STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD

If sufficiently widespread, these complications could have a substantial effect on the mortgage market, inasmuch as it would destabilize or delegitimize a system that has been embedded in the mortgage market and used by multiple participants, both government and private. Although it is impossible to say at present what the ultimate result of litigation on MERS will be, holdings adverse to MERS could have significant consequences to the market.

according to a report released by Standard & Poor.s, ¡°most¡± market participants believe that it may be possible to solve any MERS-related problems by taking the mortgage out of MERS and putting it in the mortgage owner’s name prior to initiating a foreclosure proceeding.58 According to one expert, the odds that the status of MERS will be settled quickly are low.59

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT REPORT [MERS DISCUSSION]

Posted on16 November 2010. Tags: , , , , , , ,

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT REPORT [MERS DISCUSSION]

NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT*

November 16, 2010
Examining the Consequences of Mortgage
Irregularities for Financial Stability and Foreclosure
Mitigation

*Submitted under Section 125(b)(1) of Title 1 of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343

Excerpts beginning pg 19:

Various commentators have begun to ask whether the poor recordkeeping and error-filled
work exhibited in foreclosure proceedings, described above, is likely to have marked earlier
stages of the process as well. If so, the effect could be that rights were not properly transferred
during the securitization process such that title to the mortgage and the note might rest with
another party in the process other than the trust.44

iv. MERS

In addition to the concerns with the securitization process described above, a method
adopted by the mortgage securitization industry to track transfers of mortgage servicing rights
has come under question. A mortgage does not need to be recorded to be enforceable as between
the mortgagor and the mortgagee or subsequent transferee, but unless a mortgage is recorded, it
does not provide the mortgagee or its subsequent transferee with priority over subsequent
mortgagees or lien holders.4

During the housing boom, multiple rapid transfers of mortgages to facilitate securitization
made recordation of mortgages a more time-consuming, and expensive process than in the past.46
To alleviate the burden of recording every mortgage assignment, the mortgage securitization
industry created the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), a company that
serves as the mortgagee of record in the county land records and runs a database that tracks
ownership and servicing rights of mortgage loans.47 MERS created a proxy or online registry
that would serve as the mortgagee of record, eliminating the need to prepare and record
subsequent transfers of servicing interests when they were transferred from one MERS member
to another.48 In essence, it attempted to create a paperless mortgage recording process overlying
the traditional, paper-intense mortgage tracking system, in which MERS would have standing to
initiate foreclosures.49

MERS experienced rapid growth during the housing boom. Since its inception in 1995,
66 million mortgages have been registered in the MERS system and 33 million MERS-registered
loans remain outstanding.50 During the summer of 2010, one expert estimated that MERS was
involved in 60 percent of mortgage loans originated in the United States.51

Widespread questions about the efficacy of the MERS model did not arise during the
boom, when home prices were escalating and the incidence of foreclosures was minimal.52 But
as foreclosures began to increase, and documentation irregularities surfaced in some cases and
raised questions about a wide range of legal issues, including the legality of foreclosure
proceedings in general,53 some litigants raised questions about the validity of MERS.54 There islimited case law to provide direction, but some state courts have rendered verdicts on the issue.
In Florida, for example, appellate courts have determined that MERS had standing to bring a
foreclosure proceeding.55 On the other hand, in Vermont, a court determined that MERS did not
have standing.56

In the absence of more guidance from state courts, it is difficult to ascertain the impact of
the use of MERS on the foreclosure process. The uncertainty is compounded by the fact that the
issue is rooted in state law and lies in the hands of 50 states. judges and legislatures. If states
adopt the Florida model, then the issue is likely to have a limited effect. However, if more states
adopt the Vermont model, then the issue may complicate the ability of various players in the
securitization process to enforce foreclosure liens.57 If sufficiently widespread, these
complications could have a substantial effect on the mortgage market, inasmuch as it would
destabilize or delegitimize a system that has been embedded in the mortgage market and used by
multiple participants, both government and private. Although it is impossible to say at present
what the ultimate result of litigation on MERS will be, holdings adverse to MERS could have
significant consequences to the market.

If courts do adopt the Vermont view, it is possible that the impact may be mitigated if
market participants devise a viable workaround. For example, according to a report released by
Standard & Poor.s, ¡°most¡± market participants believe that it may be possible to solve any
MERS-related problems by taking the mortgage out of MERS and putting it in the mortgage owner’s name prior to initiating a foreclosure proceeding.58 According to one expert, the odds
that the status of MERS will be settled quickly are low.59