Jan 26, 2016

“When interpreting a statute, the court must begin with the text.[e.s.]  Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, NA., 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011). “If the statute’s plain language is unambiguous and expresses [Congress’s] intent with sufficient precision, we need not look further.” Psaros v Green Tree, NJ Federal District Court (New Jersey) Case #15-4277 (JLL)(JAD)

Editor’s Note: Another decision that corroborates what I have been saying for years — that excellent actions for damages lie against both the servicers (and Trustees) AND the law firms that represent them.

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THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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Both of the cases in the above links are worthy of intense study. For one thing I have found that lawyers who skimmed the statute didn’t realize that damages were NOT limited to $1,000 per violation, plus fees and costs. Compensatory damages including that for emotional distress are readily available upon a proper showing.
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But the other thing I found interesting is that this recent case (end of December for the Psaros case) specifically references the beginning and end of a court’s authority to “interpret” the statute and specifically refers to FDCPA as a remedial statute clearly intended to lean in favor of borrowers, not the banks.
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I would suggest that when a Judge starts ranting about how he or she is not going to rule in favor of the borrower on their objections and claims for rescission, FDCPA claims etc, that the lawyer ask a simple question: “Your Honor, what part of the statute  do you find ambiguous?” When they can’t answer that question (because all courts in the land have established that there is no ambiguity, then “Your Honor, in the absence of finding an ambiguity, the court lacks authority to interpose an interpretation.
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“The statute must be followed, not changed. All three branches of government are actually in unanimous agreement that the statute must be followed word for word without any changes. Any decision from this Court to the contrary would be attempting to overrule the US Supreme Court and changing the wording of the TILA Rescission statute and the wording of the FDCPA statutes — something that the Supreme Court has expressly and unanimously stated you have no right, justification or authority to do.”

The purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). When Congress passed the legislation in 1977, it found that “[a]busive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and invasions of individual privacy.” Id. § 1692(a). “As remedial legislation, the FDCP A must be broadly construed in order

to give full effect to these purposes.” Caprio, 709 F.3d at 148. Accordingly, the Court must “analyze the communication giving rise to the FDCPA claim ‘from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.'” Kaymark v. Bank ofAmerica, N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015)…

prevail on an FDCP A claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 201 (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has alleged all four elements (Compl. 28, 29, 33, 35), and Stern Lavinthal does not dispute the first three prongs. At issue is the fourth prong: whether Stern Lavinthal violated a provision o f the FDCP A in attempting to collect the debt.

The quoted part of FDCPA: 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2).”

False or misleading representations. A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(2) The false representation of —
(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or

(B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.